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April 28, 1983 
TO: THE LAW CLERKS 
FROM: LFP, JR. 
Subject: Another Capital Case Potential Crisis 
I have just received a telephone call from u.s. 
District Judge Eugene Spellman of Florida (Tel: Nos. 306-
350-5596 and 5595), who has pending before him an 
application for a stay of an execution scheduled for early 
Tuesday A.M. May 3. 
This stay application was filed yesterday, Judge 
Spellman has held a preliminary hearing and has set 
another one for 9:30 Saturday morning, primarily to 
consider arguments as to exhaustion of State remedies. 
Judge Spellman understands that the primary issue 
relied upon before him is an issue in the case of 
Washington v. Strickland involving alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Judge Spellman thought that this Court had issued 
some sort of stay order in Strickland. Mark has checked 
with the Clerk's Office, and is advised that no stay has 
been issued here though possibly one has been issued by 
CAll. 
Nor have we acted on the cert petition. It probably 
will come up sometime in May. 
I have asked Ginny to open and maintain a file on 
this. 
L. F. P. , JR. 
LFP/vde 
men 04/28/83 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554. • . ~'"'~~i:l=!f~lt" ...._.,h'"/c_ 
<'All ~-.,,.-£\V.,£-~~deeccc..w·~ ' ('C ....... 
The State of Florida's petition in this case seeks review of 
CAll's [former CAS Unit B] ruling on the standard of review in 
cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CAll expressly rejected the ineffective assistance standard 
followed by the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida court had 
adopted the rule in United States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2d 196, 208 
(1979) (en bane), that "the accused must bear the initial burden 
of demonstrating a likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected 
the outcome of the trial." CAll rejected the "outcome-
'-.._....,- determinative" test of Decoster, holding that the petitioner has 
to show only that the ineffective assistance worked to his "actu-
al and substantial disadvantage." App. A70-A73. (The Decoster 
is followed in most courts, and for that reason 3 5 States 3 s-
have filed an amicus brief asking the Court to grant cert.) .4~ 
For your purposes here, the important point is that the 
issue raised in this petition is what showing of prejudice is 
required to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
hother issue discussed in CAll's Washington opinion -- the duty of 
~ ~ ............ 
counsel to investigate possible witnesses for use at the sentenc-
ing hearing -- is not presented for review. 
~ ~ ~ ;-..·~•c-k-J ~c,tc.. ~ ~ 4··~.-c.-J 
~ .. 
 ~~~ ~-~- .. ~ .. · "'""'·~-u~ 
-~.:S/~1":"" 4-/ra.c._<,.,,.t-: 44ttL<.&u-:J 
12M I~~.,.-~-. ...., 'f'«.._, .. , #•tne.t:~-:(1-.-".' \4 
~ A-1-~~ . C A/ 1 . .- cj ... ~-J. HtJ. '~hf. • ..,#V( J.., 4~ 
(_/~~ 
t/ ?) 5 e<' 8 
WASHINGTON, David Federal/Civil (Habeas) Timely -----
1. SUMMARY: This case concerns the proper standards for 
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
upon allegations of inadequate preparation for sentencing. A 
1vance, Godbold, Kravitch, Henderson; Tjoflat; Clark 
concurring; Johnson, Anderson concurring in part and dissenting 
in part; Roney, Hill, Fay dissenting. 
-2-
principal issue is the standard of prejudice required upon a 
finding of ineffective assistance. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS: During a ten-day period in Sept. 
1976 · tt d · f · · 1 d · v h b 1 , resp comm1 e a ser1es o cr1mes 1nc u 1ng t ree ruta 
murders. First, resp stabbed to death a minister. Three days 
later, respondent shot and stabbed three elderly women, killing 
one. Finally, resp kidnapped a college student and, after an 
attempt to extort ransom money from his family failed, resp 
stabbed him to death. "Each of these criminal episodes involved 
a substantial degree of preparation and each included acts of 
theft." (Page AS). Several days later, resp surrendered to Dade 
County police and~nfessed to the last murder. The state 
indicted resp and appointed an~perienced criminal lawyer to act 
as his attorney. On Nov. 5, resp, acting against the advice of 
counsel, ~onfessed to the two earlier murders. At trial resp 
waived his right to a jury and, again acting against the advice 
of his attorney, pleaded guilty to all charges. Resp. also 
waived his right to have a sentencing jury. At the sentencing 
hearing, his attorney argued that resp's evident remorse and 
willingness to face the consequences of his actions should lead 
the court to impose life imprisonment rather than death. He 
incorporated an earlier statement by resp denying a significant 
prior criminal record and claim that he had acted under extreme 
stress. ~unsel did not introduce further mitigating evidence, 
but was successful in excluding resp's "rap sheet" from evidence. 
The judge found, however, that even if resp had no 
-3-
significant prior criminal record, the aggravating circumstances 
clearly outweighed the factors in mitigation, and accordingly he 
sentenced resp to death for each of the three murders. The death 
sentences were upheld on direct appeal. Washington v. State, 362 
So.2d 658 (Fla. 1978), ~t. denied 441 u.s. 937 (1979). 
In March 1980 resp, represented by different counsel, moved 
' ~ ~-----------
for post-conviction relief in state court alleging that trial 
counsel's failure to investigate fully and develop mitigating 
evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Florida courts denied resp relief. Washington v. State 397 
So •• 2d 258, 287 (Fla. 1981). 
Having exhausted his state remedies, resp sought federal 
habeas corpus relief, again attacking trial counsel's preparation 
~ 
for the sentencing phase of his trial. At a DC hearing, trial 
counsel testified that he experienced a feeling of "hopelessness" 
regarding the case after resp confessed to the latter two 
murders, and sought to convince the judge of resp's sincerity and 
frankness in pleading guilty. ~unsel acknowledged that he had 
made little attempt to develop evidence of resp's emotional 
distress and did not request a presentence report or a 
psychiatric investigation because he anticipated that they might 
reveal information more harmful than helpful to his client. The 
state called the vtrial judge as a witness who, over the strenuous 
~
objection of resp's counsel, testified that evidence of the type 
contained in the resp's affi~davits and psychiatric reports 
would not have altered his decision that resp deserved the death 
penalty. The District Court found that trial counsel had made an 
-4-
error in judgment but, finding no prejudice, denied relief. -
A panel of CAS reversed, and Unit B, now CA 11, chose to 
reconsider the case en bane. A majority of the court held that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel 
requires "counsel reasonably likely to render reasonably 
effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." 
An effective counsel must conduct a reasonable amount of pretrial 
investigation. 
V"" The court then identified five guidelines for assessing 
whether investigation was constitutionally inadequate. (1) When 
counsel fails to conduct a substantial investigation into the one 
plausible line of defense in the case, there is a clear breach of 
the duty to investigate. (2) When there is only one line of 
defense, counsel is obligated to make a reasonable, though not 
necessarily exhaustive investigation. (3) If an attorney makes 
a strategic choice to rely upon one line of defense rather than 
another, and that choice is based upon the exercise of 
professional judgement after a reasonably substantial 
investigation into all plausible lines of defense, the courts 
will find counsel ineffective only if the choice was so patently 
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it. 
(Page A37-A38) (4) An attorney who makes a strategic choice to 
channel his investigation into fewer than all plausible lines of 
defense is effective so long as the assumptions upon which he 
bases his strategy are reasonable and his choices on the basis of 
those assumptions are reasonable. Whereas a strategy chosen 
after full investigation is entitled to almost automatic approval 
-5-
by the courts, a strategy chosen after partial investigation must 
be strutinized more closely in order to safeguard the rights of 
the criminal defendant. (Page A41). (5) When an attorney fails 
to conduct a substantial investigation into any of the plausible 
lines of defense, the attorney has failed to render effective 
assistance of counsel. The attorney equally fails to render 
effective assistance when he chooses among several plausible 
lines of defense, thereby excluding certain of them, for no 
strategic reason. 
The court next turned its attention to the showing of 
prejudice required. The~ bane court held that a 
a & the burden of 
assistan ted not onl ossibilit 
[it] worked to his actual and substantial disadvanta e." 
United States v. Frady, 456 u.s. ___ , ___ (1982). If defendant 
successfully satisfies this burden, the writ must be granted 
unless the State proves that counsel's ineffectiveness was _______, 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching these 
conclusions, the court rejected a rule of per se prejudice, as 
well as a rule requiring the state to prove harmlessness beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The court also re j ected the test adopted by 
the purality op1n1on in United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 
208, 211-212 (CADC), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 944 (1979), that petr ~ 
must prove a likelihood that adequate counsel would affect the 
outcome of the trial. Finally the court rejected the panel 
majority's requirement that a habeas petr show that "but for his 
counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not necessarily its 
-6-
Otltcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him," 673 
F.2d at 902, as setting too low a threshold. 
~ 
Applying these principles to the instant case, the en bane 
majority concluded that the District Court erred in three 
respects. the court improperly held that trial counsel 
was obligated to investigate substantially a line of defense 
based upon emotional distress irrespective of whether trial 
strategy made that investigation necessary~ the DC erred 
in applying the DeCoster test to determine that resp failed to ~ 
sustain his burden of showing prejudice , in reachin~ it~~~· 
decision that resp did not suffer prejudice, the DC erred 1n ~ 
considering testimony from the trial judge. It is firmly 
established that a judge may not be asked to testify about his 
mental processes· in reaching a judicial decision. Fayerweather 
v. Ritch, 195 u.s. 276, 306-30 (1904). Although the court did 
not fully agree on the DC's task, see n. 2, infra, the case was 
remanded to the DC to make findings on these issues. 
--------~--~-------------------------A number of separate opinions were filed. 2 
2Judge Tjoflat joined in part by Judge Clark, proposed a 
different prejudice test: "whether the mitigating evidence 
counsel failed to produce would have substantially or materially 
affected the decision making process of a rational sentencer." 
Judge Johnson, joined by Judge Anderson, concurred in the 
substantive portions of Judge Vance's opinion, but believed 
ineffective assistance and prejudice was clear from the record 
and that a remand was only needed to permit the state to attempt 
to rebut the showing of prejudice. 
Judge Roney, joined by Judge Fay and Judge Hill dissented. 
In their view, counsel's "effectiveness" cannot be considered 
without understanding that ~uilt_ in this case was undisputed and 
that the facts clearly just1fied l mposition of the death penalty. 
TherefOre-cDunsel fiaa to approach the case as one where mercy, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Florida contends that all the reasons for 
cert set forth in Rule 17 are present here. 
The ineffective assistance of counsel question is one of the 
most important issues in the criminal justice field. The en bane 
court's rejection of the requirement that ineffective assistance 
must have been likely to affect the outcome of the case creates a 
direct conflict with the en bane opinion of CADC in DeCoster, 
supra, and the Fla. Sup. Ct.'s decision in Knight v. State, 394 
So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), which follows DeCoster. Subsequently, in 
Armstrong v. State, ___ So.2d ___ , (Fla. 1983) the Fla. Sup. Ct. 
expressly recognized the present en bane opinion but declined to 
follow it, reaffirming its view that Knight is correct. In 
addition, there is widespread conflict among the federal circuits 
and state courts on the issue. Decisions in CAl, CA2, CAS, CA7, 
CAS and CA9 follow the DeCoster and Knight standard now rejected 
by CAll. On the other hand CA3, CA4, CA6 and CAlO have either 
presumed prejudice after an initial showing of ineffective 
counsel or have not required any showing of prejudice by a 
defendant. In addition, at least 20 states either expressly or 
impliedly adhere to the DeCoster standard. See cases cited at 
not justice was the goal. Resp's attorney, a competent and 
seasoned criminal lawyer throughly experienced in capital cases, 
faced with these facts, reached a reasonable tactical decision as 
to the only course of action which he thought could result in a 
life sentence. Finally, in the dissenters' view, the admission 
of the trial judge's testimony was, at worst, harmless error. 
Judge Hill wrote a separate dissent, essentially arguing 
that the court should reach the prejudice question first by 
examining the fairness of the trial instead of attempting to 
"convict" the attorney. 
-8-
Pages 22-25. 
Petr also contends that the decision below misconstrues a 
number of this Court's precedents. McMann v. Richardson, 397 
u.s. 759, 770-771 (1970} is improperly extended to create a 
"laundry list" of errors for ineffective assistance of counsel 
an approach rejected in DeCoster. The decision also conflicts 
with the burden of proof requirements set forth in Engle v. 
Issac, u.s. and United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97 
(1976} and misapplies United States v. Frady, supra, which 
rejected a defendant's claims precisely because there was no 
likelihood of affecting the outcome of the cause. The court also 
misapplied Fayerweather v. Ritch, supra, in excluding the 
testimony of the trial judge, which is the best evidence to 
determine whether the outcome of the trial would have been 
affected. 
Finally, petr argues that the CA and DC gave no weight to 
the factual findings of the Fla. courts that counsel was not 
constitutionally ineffective, and has ignored resp's abuse of the 
writ. 
35 states have joined in an amicus brief urging the Court to 
grant cert to resolve the conflicts that presently exist among 
the states and federal circuits on the effective assistance 
question. 
Resp. makes three arguments. (1} The ineffective assistance 
question need not be reached because the DC's error in admitting 
testimony by the sentencing judge constitutes an independent 
nonconstitutional ground for affirming the CA's judgment. (It is 
-9-
clear under Fayerweather v. Ritch, supra, that the evidence was 
improperly admitted). (2) Review at this time is premature 
because the CA remanded the case for additional factual 
determinations by the DC which could obviate, or at least 
clarify, the scope of the constitutional questions involved. (3) 
The en bane decision is consistent with this Court's precedents. 
In rejecting the outcome-determinative test of prejudice, which 
in resp's view has been adopted only by CA DC in DeCoster, the en 
bane court adopted a test of prejudice derived from this Court's 
recent decision in United States v. Frady, supra. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case concerns alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing. It may be that different 
standards govern the sentencing phase of trials, even in capital 
cases. Nevertheless, the CA has structured a standard for the 
entire trial process and the fact that this case concerns capital~ 
sentencing appears to play no role in the decision. See pA21, n. 
12 (rejecting special rule for capital cases). 
Although this Court has previously declined to review a 
number of petitions involving the effective assistance of counsel 
question, this case presents a strong warrant for review. There 
is now a direct conflict on the prejudice showing required for an \ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim between the highest state 
court and the highest federal court sitting en bane in the same 
jurisdiction as well as a conflict with the DC Circuit's DeCoster 
approach. There is more than a semantical difference between 
requiring that counsel's deficiency prejudiced defendant to the 
extent that "there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct 
-10-
affected the outcome of the court proceedings" 394 So.2d at 1001, 
and requiring that ineffective assistance "worked to his actual 
and substantial disadvantage." 
In addition to formulating a prejudice standard, the court 
of appeals has written a virtual treatise on effective 
representation of counsel with respect to pre-trial 
investigation. Florida does not detail its objections to this 
aspect of the opinion, but does claim that it constitutes an 
unwarranted expansion on this Court's McMann decision--which is 
the wellspring for the "reasonable competency" standard. This 
case presents an opportunity for the Court to pass upon the 
"reasonable competency" standard, which is followed in most but 
not all jurisdictions. 
There is also serious question about the correctness of the 
CA's disposition of this case. Judge Roney's dissent makes a 
strong argument that counsel's failure to conduct an 
investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance given 
the circumstances of the case. 
Resp's reasons to decline or defer review are unpersuasive. 
The remand to the DC only concerns the application of the en bane 
court's legal standards to the particular facts of this case, and 
would not obviate the conflict between CA 11 and the Fla. Sup. 
Ct. Similarly, the inadmissibility of the trial judge's 
testimony, a decision which appears correct, does not lessen the 
warrant for reviewing the CA ll's major pronouncement concerning 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Although resp attempts to 
minimize the extent to which the circuits are in conflict, there 
-11-
is no denial of the conflict with the Fla. Sup. Ct. and CA DC on 
the prejudice standard. 
Finally, I would not HOLD the petn for United States v. 
~
Cronic, 82-660, cert. granted, 2/22/83, which also involves an 
ineffective assistance issue. Cronic is a far more limited case-
-CA 10 applied the "reasonable competency" standard to vacate a 
conviction on the basis that counsel was inexperienced and had 
little time to prepare a defense; the court did not ground its 
finding of ineffective assistance in specific acts or omissions. 
Cronic does not involve the failure to investigate issue and the 
the Court may well not reach the prejudice issue. If this case 
is granted, however, it would make sense to schedule it for 
argument back-to-back with Cronic. 
I recommend a GRANT. 
There is a response, 3 and an amicus brief. 
May 25, 1983 Singer Opn in Appx. petn. 
3There is also a motion by resp for IFP status, which was 
granted in the lower courts, and should be granted here. 
Court ................... . June 2, 1983 ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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December 28, 1983 
STRICK GINA-POW 
82-1554 Strickland v. washington 
MEMO TO FILE 
A memo merely identifying briefly the posture of the 
case and the issues. I have read the briefs 
preliminarily, but need to take a further look, and want a 
bench memo. 
This is one of the two cases we granted to consider 
reversal by Courts of Appeals (CAll in this case) on 
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. The other case 
is 82-660, Cronic. As is true of too many cases from 
Florida in particular, the case is here on the merits 
seven years after respondent committed three murders to 
which he confessed. William Tunkey, described as "one of 
the leading criminal defense lawyers in Dade County", was 
appointed to represent respondent. Against Tunkey's 
advice, respondent confessed and plead guilty. He also 
confessed to a string of burglaries and that his murders 
were planned and premeditated. No claim is made here that 
his trial was not fair. Nor is there any claim that 
respondent was not guilty as charged. This is, however, a 
"sentencing" case. 
The alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
occurred at the sentencing hearing at which respondent was 
sentenced to death on each of the three first degree 
murder convictions. The Court found four aggravating 
circumstances present at all three murders. Respondent's 
counsel averred as statutory litigating circumstances that 
respondent had no significant history of prior criminal 
activity, that he acted under the influence of extreme 
mental disturbance, and that he was twenty-six years of 
age. Counsel also urged the court to consider that 
respondent had surrendered, confessed, and had not tried 
to escape. 
The trial court explicitly found, however, that no 
statutory mitigating factors had been proved, and held 
that any other mitigating circumstances were insufficient 
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Florida 
Supreme Court affirmed, and we denied certiorari. 441 
u.s. 937 (1979). 
Thereafter, and for the first time on a mot ion for 
post conviction relief in state court, respondent 
contended that Tunkey had rendered ineffective assistance. 
The state court denied relief. In Florida one must prove 
(i) "a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below 
that of conpetent counsel", and ( i i) "a 1 ikel ihood that 
the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court 
proceedings". The state court observed that the 
aggravating circumstances were "simply overwhelming, and 
that respondent did not contend that Tunkey was 
ineffective in failing to rebut them or in fa i 1 ing to 
present evidence of any statutory litigating 
circumstances". Respondent did contend, however, that 
Tunkey was ineffective in not conducting an investigation 
of certain non-statutory mitigating factors: Difficult 
childhood, lack of a job, new baby, need for money. 
Finally, the state trial court found "beyond any 
doubt" that "there is not even the remotest chance that 
the outcome would have been any different" if counsel had 
taken the measures respondent identified. 
The Florida Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the 
trial court's findings and denial of relief. 
Respondent then sought federal habeas, and after a 
hearing the DC also denied relief. The DC did say that 
counsel had erred in judgment in not conducting an 
investigation of family, friends and medical experts, but 
found there was not "a likelihood, or even a significant 
possibility, that the balancing of aggravating against 
mitigating circumstances ••• would have altered [the death 
penalty] in respondent's favor". 
Suprisingly, CAll en bane (8-4) vacated and remanded 
for further proceedings. It noted that although the DC 
found that Tunkey committed an error of judgment, it 
stopped short of finding him ineffective. The essence of 
the remand, as I understand it, is that CAll thought the 
District Court should consider further whether Tunkey had 
failed to make the investigation referred to by the DC was 
justified in doing so because of a "legitimate tactical 
choice". 
But CAll did make clear that respondent also would 
have to demonstrate some degree of prejudice by showing 
that counsel's errors resulted in actual and substantial 
disadvantage to the course of his defense. And if 
respondent carried this burden,* the state then must show 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
formulating this test, CAll declined to follow the 
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in U.S. v. 
DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (en bane) - a decision that would 
require the defendant to demonstrate a likelihood that 
counsel's errors had an effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
*Seems to me that the opinions of the state courts make 
clear that respondent failed to carry this burden. I 
don't understand why CAll reversed and prolonged this much 
litigated case. 
The SG's Position 
As stated in the summary of argument, the SG says 
that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two 
independent elements: {i) Proof that the atttorney's 
performance fell measurably below the range of competence 
demanded of defense counsel, and {ii) a showing the 
substantial prejudice resulted. The SG argues that in 
this case, relief must be denied for failure to satisfy 
the prejudice, without regard to whether counsel performed 
in a reasonably competent manner. 
The SG also relies, as would be expected, on Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 u.s. 107 and Frady, 456 u.s. 152. The 
rationale of these cases is that when a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on collateral 
attack, a requirement that prejudice be shown is compelled 
by the "cause and actual prejudice" standard. 
The SG argues that the "universally accepted" 
standard in cases where a new trial is sought on the basis 
of newly discovered evidence is that the evidence probably 
would result in an acquittal {or, vacating of the sentence 
of death). 
In sum, the SG argues that before a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to a new trial on account of an 
alleged failure by his lawyer to investigate and present 
certain evidence, he must demonstrate that the "additional 
evidence - if presented - probably would have affected the 
outcome of the trial". 
The SG agrees that CAll correctly held that a showing 
of prejudice is an essential element of an inef feet i ve 
assistance of counsel claim. Nevertheless, because CAll 
remanded the case to the District Court, we should reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and direct it to 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Respondent's Argument 
Respondent argues that where there has been 
ineffective assistance 
whether the outcome of 
of counsel, it is immaterial 
the case necessarily would have 
been different. Br. 18, 28, 58. Curiously, respondent 
does not ask that we affirm CAll, although it had vacated 
and remanded for further proceedings in the DC. Rather, 
respondent wants us to remand to CAll with directions to 
apply an entirely different standard. It, understandably, 
disagrees with CAll's view that prejudice must be shown as 
every court that has considered this case - with the 
exception of CAll - has found no prejudice. 
Respondent says the case should be judged on Sixth 
Amendment grounds (the Constitutional right to counsel) 
and not on Fifth Amendment due process grounds. 
Respondent's Trenton, New Jersey lawyers, propose their 
own "test of prejudice: all that is required is that a 
habaes petitioner must show that "counsel's serious 
derelictions impaired the defense". (Br. 4). It is 
immaterial whether these derelict ions in fact prejudiced 
the outcome of the trial. In this case, it is immaterial 
whether the investigation that counsel "failed to make" 
would not have affected the courts imposing the sentence 
of death. 
Respondent also relies on "several factors" that 
should be weighed to determine whether the defense in a 
particular case was impaired (Br. 87). These include 
whether the undivided allegiance of counsel was impaired 
(e.g., Cuyler -conflict of interest): the "pervasiveness 
of counsel's inadequacies"; whether counsel's oversights 
resulted in impoverished record"; and that "capital cases 
demand special efforts by counsel and special sensitivity 
by courts to the impact of counsel's actions." 
As I view it now, it is clear that CAll should be 
reversed. The SG's standard (p. 5 above) seems right to 
me. Unless my clerk has a different view, a brief summary 
- a couple of pages - of his or her views will suffice. 
LFP, JR. 
('~~~~~ 
(~~ ~ ~ Jz.!2~)#...-t Cl111 
~ ~ ....-;<.~ e *" . 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 82-1554 
(Argument date January 10, 1984) 
Cammie R. Robinson Strickland v. Washington December 30, 1983 
Question Presented 
What is the proper standard of prejudice applicable to a 
collateral attack on a death sentence that is based on a claim 
that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, develop, 
and present additional evidence at the sentencing hearing? 
I. DISCUSSION 
I agree with your memo of December 28, 1983 that the 
state courts and the DC applied the correct standard of prejudice 
and that the judgment of CAll should be reversed. 
A. Proper Standard of Prejudice 
This case presents a quarrel over the proper standard of 
prejudice applicable to a habeas claim that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, develop, and 
present additional evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital 
case. The choice is between the standard of prejudice 
articulated in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (CADC), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1976) (likelihood that inadequacy 
affected the outcome}, and the standard articulated in CAll's en 
bane opinion (inadequacy worked to defendant's actual and 
substantial disadvantage} • CAll expressly rejected the Decoster 
' 
standard that both the state court and the DC had applied on two 
grounds: (1} the standard would require the petitioner to carry a 
burden of showing prejudice that is greater than the "actual 
. . 
cause and prejudice" showing required by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 87 (1977}; and, (2} it is proper, with respect to 
ineffective assitance claims alleging failure to produce relevant 
evidence, for petitioner to bear the burden of showing what 
evidence should have been produced, but it is not proper to 
require petitioner to bear the burden of showing that production 
of this evidence would have effected the trial outcome. I 
disagree with both these reasons. 
CAll is incorrect that requiring a habeas petitioner to 
meet the Decoster standard would impose a greater burden than the 
"actual cause and prejudice " standard of Wainwright. This Court 
observed in United States v. Frady, 456 u.s. 152, 168 (1982), 
that Wainwright had "refrained from giving 'precise content' to 
the term 'prejudice,' expressly leaving to future cases further 
elaboration of the significance of that term." Frady gave 
content to the term "prejudice" only in the context of a 
collateral attack on jury instructions and indicated that "the 
import of the term in other situations remains an open 
question." 456 u.s., at 168. Nothing in this Court's opinions 
suggests that the Decoster court's definition of prejudice in the 
present context is inconsistent with the "actual cause and 
prejudice" standard announced in Wainwright. 
CAll's reasoning on its second point is also flawed. It 
reasoned that it was inappropriate to require petitioner to show 
that counsel's failure to investigate, develop, and produce 
additional evidence was outcome determinative because petitioner 
"is no better situated than the state to demonstrate that the new 
evidence was likely to alter the outcome of the case." Cert. 
Pet. App. at A72. There are two flaws to this argument. First, 
Decoster does not require that petitioner show that the 
additional evidence would have been outcome determinative, but 
only that it was likely to affect the outcome. Once petitioner 
has made that showing, the State may show that the additional 
bench memo: Strickland v. washington, No. 82-1554 page 4 
evidence in fact was not outcome determinative. Second, it is 
common on motions for new trials based on the alleged discovery 
of new evidence to require the movant to show that the new 
/)_ . ~ 
evidence would have had a l1kely effec~ on the trial. See, ~, 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 and cases cited in SG's Brief at 19 n.lO. 
This showing is required on direct review. Because of the 
greater interests in protecting the finality of judgments from 
collateral attack, see Frady, 456 u.s., at 166, it would be 
inconsistent with this Court's decisions to impose a lesser ~~ 
burden on ha~ petitioners. ~r~;e~ , if counsel's--failure 
~a.. 
investigate, develop, or produce additional evidence had no if/L 
likelihood of affecting the outcome of the proceedings, it is ~~ 
hard to see how a habeas petitioner has been denied his 
onstitutional right to effective counsel. There certainly is no 
constitutional guarantee that counsel will be perfect. 
I agree with the SG that the standard of prejudice ......----...-
applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should 
I / ~ 
focus on the particular nature of the claimed inadequacy and .... . 
---------~--f~------------------------------should not be applied categorically to all ineffective assistance 
claims. SG's Brief at 18. Thus, the Court should make clear 
that whatever standard of prejudice articulated in this case 
controls only ineffective assistance claims based on counsel's 
alleged failure to investigate, develop, and produce additional 
evidence. In this narrow context, I believe that the Decoster 
standard applied by the state court and the DC sets forth the 
appropriate standard of prejudice. Under this standard, it is 
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1 / ,~ 
focus on the particular nature of the claimed inadequacy at 
~· ~ ----------------------should not be applied categorically to all ineffective assistance 
claims. SG's Brief at 18. Thus, the Court should make clear 
that whatever standard of prejudice articulated in this case 
controls only ineffective assistance claims based on counsel's 
alleged failure to investigate, develop, and produce additional 
evidence. In this narrow context, I believe that the Decoster 
standard applied by the state court and the DC sets forth the 
appropriate standard of prejudice. Under this standard, it is 
clear that washington's habeas petition should be denied and the 
order of CAll reversed. 
B. Application of the Standard to Facts of this Case 
Washington's attack on his counsel's performance at _____.,. 
sentencing is narrow. He concedes that the State produced 
overwelming evidence proving the existence of 5 statutory 
aggravating circumstances. He does not dispute that counsel 
could have produced additional evidence of statutory mitigating 
circumstances. He claims only that counsel failed adequately to 
in~tiga~e, develop, and produce evidence of non-statutory 
mitigating circumstances. Specifically, Washington claims 
his counsel was ineffective in faili~g to do 5 things: (1) to 
obtain a psychiatric evaluation determining his mental state a 
the time of the crime~ (2) to investigate readily available 
witnesses concerning his character and background~ (3) to reque t 
a presentence report (4) to present a meaningful closing 
argument~ and, (5) to secure an independent evaluation of the 
reports of the medical examiners. The evidence that Washington 
claims his counsel should have produced consists of 14 affidavits 
of family and friends testifying to the effect that they knew 
defendant to be a "good person" who worked hard, was not prone to 
violence, and had no prior history of criminal activity~ and, the 
reports of a psychologist and a psychiatrist indicating their 
opinion that~ashington was legally sane, but depressed at the 
time of the crimes. Both the state court and the DC examined the 
proffered evidence and each of the alleged failings of counsel 
and determined that none had any likelihood of affecting the ? ~ 
outcome of the sentencing proceedings. ~ ~~G 
~T~ 
As to the claims concerning the failure to secure 
psychiatric evaluations, the state court and the DC found that 
such evaluations likely would have done more harm than good: all 
indications were that Washington was sane at the time of the 
crime and that, contrary to defense counsel's argument at the 
sentencing proceeding, he was not operating under extreme 
emotional distress. The proffered psychiatric reports support 
these indications. If counsel had attempted to introduce any 
psychiatric evidence to support his argument, it probably would 
have been destroyed on cross-examination. See State Court 
Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A221-223; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. 
at A275-276. As to the claim concerning the failure to request a 
presentence report, the state court and the DC found that such a 
request likely would have done more harm than good: defense 
counsel successfully excluded Washington's "rap sheet," which I 
suppose would have disclosed any of defendant's prior criminal 
activity; any presentence report would have included this "rap 
sheet" and would have put before the judge all of defendant's 
prior criminal activities. 1 See State Court Opinion, Cert. Pet. 
App. at A227-228; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A280. As to the 
claim concerning failure to investigate available witnesses, the 
1I have not found any reference describing what if any prior 
criminal acts were committed by defendant. 
state court and the DC examined the 14 affidavits and found that 
they contained much the same evidence presented in Washington's 
detailed confessions, that they disclosed that the affiants were 
unaware of Washington's prior criminal record, and thus that they 
could have been destroyed on cross-examination. See State Court 
Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. at A224-225; DC Opinion, Cert. Pet. App. 
at A264-267. After conducting these detailed examinations of 
Washington's claims, both the state court and the DC made the 
determination that he had not shown any likelihood that any of 
the evidence that counsel allegedly should have produced would 
have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 2 Because 
there is no reason to question these determinations, I recommend 
that the Court reverse the judgment of CAll and order that 
Washington's habeas petition be denied. Because the prejudi 
determinations of the state court and the DC were made 
independently of the testimony of Judge Fuller, there is no 
for this Court to determine whether that testimony was 
--admissible. 
2The state court of appeals held that "the record affirmatively 
demonstrates beyond any doubt that even if Mr. Tunkey had done 
each of the foregoing things at the time of the sentencing, there 
is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have been 
any different." Cert. Pet. App. at A230. The Supreme Court 
affirmed unanimously, stating that "we believe, to the point of 
moral certainty, that [defendant] is entitled to no relief." 
Cert. Pet. App. at A250. The DC held an evidentiary hearing 
during which it examined the evidence that counsel allegedly 
should have introduced. It held that "there does not appear to 
be a likelihood, or even a significant possibility that the 
balancing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances under 
the Florida death penalty statute would have been altered in 
[defendant's] favor." Cert. Pet. App. at A286. 
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I believe a ~~ndar~which puts the initial 
burden on the pe{itioner to demonstrate pre-
judice or the likelihood that cpunsel' 
------(naction affected the outcome of the sentence, $......... ....,...-, ...... ~,.... 
i~_appropriate here. See~ United State 
v. Decoster, suEra at 208. 
In applying the standard to the facts at 
hand, I find no showing of prejudice. In --reaching this determination, I have consider-
ed Judge Fuller's testimony that even if he 
had considered the live testimony of character 
and psychiatric witnesses, as proposed in the 
affidavits, he believes he would have imposed 
the death sentence. However, r~iz~the 
potential weakness of hindsight anal~sis, I 
,....----: -
have not treated Judge Fuller's testimony 
as determinative on the issue of prejudice. 
psychiatric testim~ny, and weighing it aaainst ------------the detailed record of petitioner's conduct 
in initiat~ng and carrying out three separate 




murder, there does not appear to be a likeli-
'' hood, or even a significant possibility that 
circumstances under the Florida death penalty 
statute would have been altered in petitioner's 
favor. Critically, the character and medical 
testimony ,cannot reasonably be characterized 
as evidence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. Nore does it provide persuasive 
rationalization for petitioner's extended and 
calculated course of violence. Therefore, 
......... 
it my determination on the critical legal 
A - ~ 
issue, that petitioner was not prejudiced by 
.......__..... ,.,.. .......... ......- ,.... ~
the inaction which did occur, and was not 
denied his Constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel, as that standard is 
defined under present case law. 
IV. 
During the evidentiary hearing, a question 
was raised as to whether Judge Fuller con-
sidered or utilized the Jacobson psychiatric 
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'c This case requires us to consider the J?!Oper standards for 
L '~ ('2.-t.L judging a criminal defendant's <t_?ntention that the Constitu-
1, t ~ /.-() , , ~n requires a conviction or deaflf'sentence to be set aside 
 because counsel's assistance at the trial or sentencing was 
cJ-? 1<6- 9 ~c~/s_ ~~ 7 
A 
L\ 5 ~ , During a ten-day period in September 1976, respondent 
~ planned and committed three groups of crimes, which in- t'J 
~ eluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, J ~ rU_tJ 
~ · severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, ~~ 
and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, re-
- _ spondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a 'S tJ c k.-
~ ~ lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal epi-~ ~ ~ 
~ .... / J sodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnap- t 
- ping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal law- fVYL 2 3-2 s-
~ j yer to represent him. ' 
.J'f _ • Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. 
~ ~ .He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense 
~ j- hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against 
 ~ his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first 
/1 ... ./ _fl h L _ • (},. two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was sub-
r.,_.~ ' ~ ject to indi tment for hree counts of first degree murder and 
-~~ ~2/ 
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multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking 
and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy 
to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury 
trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty 
to all charges, including the three capital murder charges. 
In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, 
although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no 
significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his 
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his in-
ability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated, 
however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes. 
E. g., App. 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that he 
had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step 
forward and admit their responsibility" but that he was mak-
ing no statement at all about his likely sentencing decision. 
App. 62. 
Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Flor-
ida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. 
Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. He 
chose instead to be sente:l)ced by the trial judge without a 
jury recommendation. 
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke 
with respondent about his background. He also spoke on 
the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he 
did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with 
them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses 
for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he 
request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations 
with his client gave no indication that respondent had psycho-
logical problems. I d., at A266. 
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look fur-
ther for evidence concerning respondent's character and emo-
tional state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of 
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of re-
spondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at 
A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to 
82-1554-0PINION 
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rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's 
background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea 
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these 
subjects, and by foregoing the opportunity to present new 
evidence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from 
cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on 
psychiatric evidence of its own. I d., at A223-A225. 
Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other 
evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He success-
fully moved to exclude respondent's "rap sheet." !d., at 
A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence re-
port might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would 
have included respondent's criminal history and thereby un-
dermined the claim of no significant history of criminal activ-
ity, he did not request that one be prepared. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266. 
At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based 
primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as 
well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it 
important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime. 
He argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty. 
I d., at A265-A266. Counsel argued that respondent had no 
history of criminal activity and that respondent committed 
the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating circum-
stances. He also argued that respondent should be spared 
death because he had surrendered, confessed, and offered to 
testify against a co-defendant and because respondent was 
fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone badly 
wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The State put 
on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose of describ-
ing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not cross-examine 
the medical experts who testified about the manner of death 
of respondent's victims. 
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The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances 
with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all 
three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, 
all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were 
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and 
violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders 
were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed 
to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder 
law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, re-
spondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave 
risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the mur-
der victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe--in one 
case, ultimately fatal-injuries. 
With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge 
made the same findings for all three capital murders. First, 
although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions, 
respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of 
stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant 
history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances 
"would still clearly far outweigh" that mitigating factor. 
Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, re-
spondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of his 
acts. Third, none of the victims was a participant in, or 
consented to, respondent's conduct. ·Fourth, respondent's 
participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of 
duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respond-
ent's age (26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation, 
especially when viewed in light of respondent's planning of 
the crimes and disposition of the proceeds of the various ac-
companying thefts. 
In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating cir-
cumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant) 
mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three 
convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: "A 
careful consideration of all matters presented to the court im-
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pels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances . 
. . . "See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663-664 (Fla. 
1978), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 937 (1979) (quoting trial court 
findings). He therefore sentenced respondent to death on 
each of the three counts of murder and to prison terms for the 
other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the con-
victions and sentences on direct appeal. Ibid. 
B 
Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief in state 
court on numerous grounds, among them that counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding. 
Respondent challenged counsel's assistance in six respects. 
He asserted that counsef was ineffective because he fa1led to 
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request 
a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character 
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to 
present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and 
to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-exam-
ine the medical experts. In support of the claim, respondent 
submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neignbors, and 
rel~stafing1ll:anliey wou ave testified 1f asKed to do 
so:-Hearso submitted one psychiatric report and one psy-
chological report stating that respondent, though no under 
the ~m uence o extreme mental or emotion disturbance, was 
"chronically frustrated and depressed because of his eco-
nomic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. App. 7; see also 
id., at 14. 
The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hear-
ing, finding that the record evidence conclusively showed 
that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A20~A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial er-
rors required little discussion. First, there were no grounds 
to request a continuance, so there was no error in not re-
questing one when respondent pleaded guilty. ld., at 
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A218-A220. Second, failure to request a presentence inves-
tigation was not a serious error because the trial judge had 
discretion not to grant such a request and because any 
presentence investigation would have resulted in admission 
of respondent's rap sheet and thus undermined his assertion 
of no significant history of criminal activity. I d., at 
A226-A228. Third, the argument and memorandum given 
to the sentencing judge were "admirable" in light of the over-
whelming aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigat-
ing circumstances. Id., at A228. Fourth, there was no 
error in failure to examine the medical examiner's reports or 
to cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the 
manner of death of respondent's victims, since respondent 
admitted that the victims died in the ways shown by the un-
challenged medical evidence. I d., at A229. 
The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other 
bases for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out 
that a psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted 
by state order soon after respondent's initial arraignment. 
That report states that there was no indication of major men-
tal illness at the time of the crimes. Moreover, both the re-
ports submitted in the collateral proceeding state that, al-
though respondent was "chronically frustrated and depressed 
because of his economic dilemma," he was not under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three 
reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the 
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime 
spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to 
seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea 
colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention, 
counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim 
with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating 
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial 
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psy-
chiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack. 
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The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to de-
velop and to present character evidence for much the same 
reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceed-
ing showed nothing more than that certain persons would 
have testified that respondent was basically a good person 
who was worried about his family's financial problems. Re-
spondent himself had already testified along those lines at the 
plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course 
of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affi-
davits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judge 
stated that the death sentence would be appropriate even if 
respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no sub-
stantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of 
the character evidence offered in the collateral attack. 
Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articu-
lated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 198n , tfiefr laf coUrt concluded that respond-
ent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any sub-
stantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of com-
petent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of 
the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found 
that, "as a matter of law, the record affirmatively demon-
strates beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each 
of the ... things [that respondent alleged counsel had failed 
to do] at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remot-
est chance that the outcome would have been any different. 
The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved 
in this case were completely overwhelming. . . . " App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A230. 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. 
Washington v. State , 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). For essen-
tially the reasons given by the trial court, the supreme court 
concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima 
facie case of either "substantial deficiency or possible preju-
dice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree that we be-
lieve, to the ppint of a moral certainty, that he is entitled to 
82-1554-0PINION 
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no relief .... " Id., at 287. Respondent's claims were 
"shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the 
need for an evidentiary hearing." Id., at 286. 
c 
Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus / ""VI ~ J...f-/ ( 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief, 
among them ineffective assistance of counsel based on the 
same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance, 
as tho e had identified in state court. The District Court 
held n evidentiary hearin to inquire into tnal counsel'S ef-
forts to inves 1gate an o pre~tances. 
Respon en o ffere e a aav1 s and repo s e ha submit-
ted in state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial 
counsel to testify, The State of Florida, over respondent's 
objection, called the trial judge to testify. 
The District Court disputed none of the state court factual 
findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made find-
ings of its own that are consistent with the state court find-
ings. The account of trial counsel's actions and decisions 
given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal 
issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, al-
though trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to in-
vestigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he 
did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any 
such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's 
testimony but also on the same factors that led the state 
courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that 
"there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant 
possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the 
outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A285-A286. The District Court went on to reject all 
of respondent's other grounds for relief, including .one not ex-
hausted in state court, which the District Court considered 
because, among other reasons, the state urged its consider-
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ation. I d., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied 
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. /) 
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals (! H 11 Q • ~ 
for the Fifth Circuit affinned in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded with instructions to apply to the particular facts the 
framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it devel~ 
oped in its opinion. 673 F. 2d 879 (1982). The panel deci-
sion was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, ec1 e to rehear the case en 
bane. 679 F. 2d 23 (1982). The ful ourt o ea s evel-
ope Its o~ framework for an~Zing ineffective assistance 
claims and reverSeCftlie juogment of the District Court and 
remanded the case for new factfinding under the newly an-
nounced standards. 693 F. 2d 1243 (1982). 
The court noted at the outset that, because respondent had 
raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing in the 
District Court, the habeas petition might be characterized as 
a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal offue entire petition. 
The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement is 
"a rriatter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" and 
hence admitted of exceptions. The court agreed with the 
District Court that this case came within an exception to the 
mixed petition rule. 693 F. 2d, at 1248, n. 7. 
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded 
~
criminal defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to 
render and rendering reasonabl ef ectlve assistance given 
the o a 1ty o t e circumstances." I d., at 1 he court 
remarke in passmg a no special standard applies in capi-
tal cases such as the one before it: the punishment that a de-
fendant faces is merely one of the circumstances to be consid-
ered in determining whether counsel was reasonably 
effective. !d., at 1250, n. 12. The court then addressed re-
spondent's contention that his trial counsel's assistance was 
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not reasonably effective because counsel breached his duty to 
investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 
The co~ agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on 
counsel ~ut to investigate, because reasonably effective 
assistance must be base on professional decisions and in-
formed legal choices can be made only after investigation of 
options. The court observed that counsel's investigatory de-
cisions must be assessed in light of the information known at 
the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that "[t]he 
amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies pre-
cise measurement." !d., at 1251. Nevertheless, putting 
guilty-plea cases to one side, the court attempted to classify 
cases presenting issues concernin~to 
inves 1ga e e or p oce 1 g o ria . 
t ere is o y one p aus1 e me of defense, the court con-
cluded, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial inves-
tigation" into that line of defense; since there can be no stra-
tegic choice that renders such an investigation unnecessary. 
I d., at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel relies at trial 
on only one line of defense, although others are available. In 
either case, the investigation need not be exhaustive. It 
must include "'an independent examination of the facts, cir-
cumstances, pleadings and laws involved.'" I d. , at 1253 
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F. 2d 103, 104 (CA5 1979)). 
The scope of the duty, however, depends on such facts as the 
strength of the government's case and the likelihood that 
pursuing certain leads may prove more harmful than helpful. 
I d., at 1253, n. 16. 
If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court 
held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substan-
tially before making a strategic choice about which lines to 
rely on at trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investi-
gations, the strategic choices made as a result "will seldom if 
ever" be found wanting. Because advocacy is an art and not 
a science, and because the adversary system requires defer-
ence to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must 
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be respected in these circumstances if they are based on pro-
fessional judgment. I d., at 1254. 
If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into 
each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may 
nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain 
lines of defense for other than strategic reasons. I d., at 
1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may 
force early strategic choices, often based solely on conversa-
tions with the defendant and a review of the prosecution's ev-
idence. Those strategic choices about which lines of defense 
to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the reason-
ableness of the professional judgments on which they are 
based. Thus, "when counsel's assumptions are reasonable 
given the totality of the circumstances and when counsel's 
strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those as-
sumptions, counsel need not investigate lines of defense that 
he has chosen not to employ at trial." I d., at 1255 (footnote 
omitted). Among the factors relevant to deciding whether 
particular strategic choices are reasonable are the experience 
of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued 
lines of defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking 
an unpursued line of defense. I d., at 1256-1257, n. 23. 
Having outlined the standards for judging whether defense 
counsel fulfilled the duty to investi e the C of Appeals 
turned its attention to the uestion of the re 'udic to the de-
fense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify re-
versal of the judgment. The court observed that only in 
cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government 
interference in the representation process, or of inherently 
prejudicial conflicts of interest had this ·Court said that no 
special showing of prejudice need be made. I d., at 
1258-1259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel, 
where the government is not directly responsible for the defi-
ciencies and where evidence of deficiency may be more acces-
sible to the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant ,6 ~ 
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stantial disadvantage to the course of his defense." I d., at 
1262. This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is com-
patible with the "cause and prejudice" standard for overcom-
ing procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and 
discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a 
showing, which could virtually always be made, of some con-
ceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors . 
. The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of 
the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution 
showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was, 
in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. !d., at 1260-1262. 
The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied C IJ.- I I ~ 
in the Eleventh C1rCulrm cEalTenges to convictions on the 
ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the 
judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging 
ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in fed-
eral habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280 
(opinion of Tjoflat, J.); id., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id., 
at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay, J., and 
James C. Hill, J.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and 
although some believed that no remand was necessary in this 
case, id. at 1281-1285 (opinion of Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J., 
joined by Anderson, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, 
J., joined by Fay, J., and James C. Hill J :); id. , at 1288-1291 ~~ 
(opinion of Hill, J.), majority of the judge of the en bane · /' · 1 
court agreed that the case s ou e remanded for application 
of the newly announced st andards.---s-ummar1ly reJecting re-
spo~11er tnan n1effectiveness of counsel, the 
court accordingly reversed the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case. On remand, the court finally 
ruled, the state trial judge's testimony, though admissible "to 
the extent that it coptains personal knowledge of historical 
facts or expert opinion," was not to be considered admitted 
into evidence to explain the judge's mental processes in 
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reaching his sentencing decision. I d., at 1262-1263; see 
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 306--307 (1904). 
D 
Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of 
Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously 
considered in any generality. The Co~rt has considered 
Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive de-
nial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims 
based on state interference with the ability of counsel to ren-
der effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States 
v. Cronic, ante. With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which invofved a claim that 
counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of 
interest, the Court has never directly" and full addressed a 
cla~f "actua ine ec 1v ness o counse s assistance in a 
case going to tnal. Cf. me tates v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 
102, n. 5 (1976). 
In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts 
of Appeals and all but a few state courts have now aaopted . 1 J? . ~ 
the 'rea o abl effective assistance''?standard' ]in one for- ~ ~\. 
mulation or another. ee rapnell v. United States, 725 F. 
2d ~A2 1983); Brief for United States in United 
States v. Cronic, 0. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno, 
Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to 
Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal 
Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court 
has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the 
proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a de-
fendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the 
lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more 
than formulation. See Brief for United States in United 
States v. Cronic, 0. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 7a-10a; Sarno, 
supra, at 83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in 
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this case expressly rejected the prejudice standard articu-
lated by Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United 
States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2 6, , 211- 12 (CADC) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979), and adopted by the 
State of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. \ 
1981), a standard that requires a showin that s ecified defi-
cient conduct of counse was e y to ave a ected t e out-
come of the eeding. 693 F. 2 , a 1 -1 2. 
For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the ~ ~ 
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitu- ~ L/1....(__~'" 
tion requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because 
of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. -- U. S. 
-- (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions, 
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 515-520 (1982). We therefore 
address the merits of the constitutional issue. 
II 
In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has 
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, 
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a 
fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through 
the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of 
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
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for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence." 
Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adver-
sarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolu-
tion of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The 
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's 
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 
"ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to 
which they are entitled. Adams v. United States ex rel. 
McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275, 276 (1942); see Powell v. Ala-
bama, supra, at 68-69. 
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, this 
Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person ac-
cused ofa federal or state crime has the right to have counsel 
appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. That a person who 
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the ac-
cused, however, is not enough to satisfy the c·onstitutional 
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to 
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's play-
ing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial sys-
tem to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be as-
sisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who 
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. 
For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right 
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). 
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it 
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make 
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. 
See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar 
on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Her-
ring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at 
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-613 
... > 
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(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593--596 (1961) (bar on 
direct examination of defendant). Counsel, however, can 
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, 
simply by failing to render "adequate legal assistance," 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. I d., at 345--350 (actual 
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance 
renders assistance ineffective). 
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the con-
stitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter 
class of cases-that is, those presenting claims of "actual inef-
fectiveness ." In giving meaning to the requirement, how-
ever, we must take its purpose-to ~sure a fair trial-as the 
guide. The benclimark for judging any claim of ineffectlve-
{
nessmust be whether counsel's conduct so u . in the 
proper functioning o e a versarial process that the trial 
cannot oe relled on as ffiviilgJ).zya-uced al ust resu~ 
The same principle apj)iies to a•cap'ital sentenc'rng proceed-
ing such as that provided by Florida law. We need not con-
sider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may 
involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in 
the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to 
the definition of constitutionally effective assistance. A cap-
ital sentencing proceeding like the one i:r:!Yolved in th!§.. case, 
however~tly like a trial 'in its adversarial format 
an<riilthe existence of staooaras foraecision, see Barclay v. 
Florida, 463 U. S. --, -- (1983); Bullington v. Missouri , 
451 U. S. 430 (1980), that counsel's role in the proceeding is 
comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the ad-
versarial testin rocess works to roduce a 'ust result under 
the s an ar s governmg ec1s10n. or purposes o escrib-
ing counsel's duties, therefore, Florida's capital sentencing 
proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial. 
III 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was 
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death 
• 
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sentence has two components. ~' the defendant must 
show that counsel's erformance was deficient. This re-
quires s owing that counsel made errors so serious that coun-
sel was not functioning as the "counsel" aranteed the de-
fendant by the Sixth Amendment. econ9) the defendant 
must show that the deficient _performance 2 rejudiced the de-
fense. This requiressnowrng that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable". Un!eSs'1t defendant makeSboth 
showmgs, 1t cannot be said that the conviction or death sen-
tence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
A 
As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the 
proper standard for attorney performance is that of reason-
ably effective ass!§1ance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 
F. 2d, at --. The Court indirectly recognized as much 
when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770, 771, 
that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate 
legal advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent 
attorney" and the advice was not "within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See also 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted de-
fendant complains of the ineffectiveness of' counsel's assist-
ance, the defendant must .show that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth 
Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying par-
ticular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead 
on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient 
to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the 
role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. 
See Michel v. New York, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasu a eness un er pre.va1 n pro essional norms. 
Representation of a, cr1mma defen ant entails certain basic 
duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and 
...___-
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hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 
346. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant 
derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's 
cause and the more particular duties to consult wi~e de- j-
fendant on important decisions and to eep e efendant in-
formed of important developments in t e course o the pros-
eciitiOIL" Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill 
and knowledge as will re:n_der the trial a reliable adversarial 
testing pro~s. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 
6~9. 
These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obliga-
tions of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of 
attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffec-
tiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether 
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the cir-
cumstances. Prevailing norms· of practice as reflected in 
American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g. , ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) 
("The Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of ] 
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satlsfacton e ac-
coun o e variety of circumstances faced by defense coun- ~ 
sel or e range o egltl_!!!~!~.._<!~i ~ best to 
repr~rae!enaant. A ny such set of rules would 
interfe nstitutionally protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in 
making tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster, 
624 F. 2d, at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guide-
lines for representation could distract counsel from the over-
riding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. 
Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal 
representation, although that is a goal of considerable impor-
tance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure 
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's 
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 133-134 (1982). A fair assess-
ment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to re-
construct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time. In addition, in making the evaluation, a court must in-
dulge a stron presumption that counsel's conduct falls within /.2.-~ 
the wide ran e o reasona e ro esswna ass1s ance. See 
Miche v. ew or , supra, at ere are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even 
the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a par-
ticular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, The Trial 
for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 343 (1983). 
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney 
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would vr~ 
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. ~~ 
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would 
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of 
counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and 
even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. In-
tensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for accept-
able assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the inde-
pendence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of 
assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney 
and client. 
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must 
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on 
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of coun-
sel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of inef-
82-1554-0PINION 
20 STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 
fective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of coun-
sel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The court must then determine 
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts 
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance. In making that determination, the 
court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elabo-
rated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adver-
sarial testing process work in the particular case. At the 
same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made arr--
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment. 
These standards require no special amplification in order to 
define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this 
... -
case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices 
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate-
gic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profes-
s!onal judgments support the limitations on investigation. 
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable inves-
tigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes par-
ticular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness 
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, apply-
ing a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined 
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own state-
ments or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite 
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defend-
ant and on information supplied by the defendant. In par-
ticular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends 
critically on such information. For example, when the facts 
that support a certain potential line of defense are generally 
known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the 
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need for further investigation may be considerably dimin-
ished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has 
given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investi-
gations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure 
to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as 
unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations 
with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of 
counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a 
proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions. 
See United States v. Decoster, 624 F. 2d, at 209-210. 
B 
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, \ 
does not warrant setting aside the · ud ent of a criminal 
procee mg e error ad no effect on th.e J~ent. Cf. 
Unitea States v. Morrison,449' U. S: 361-;-3~5 (1981). 
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is 
to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accord-
ingly, an deficiencies in counsel's erformance e rej-
udicial to t en e m or er to constl ute meffective assist-
ance under the Constitution. 
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is pre- /3u.:t~~ 
sumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of ~ ~ 
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. 
So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's as-~
sistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at -- - --
& n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that 
case by case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. 
Id., at--. Moreover, such circumstances involve impair-
ments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify 
and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly 
responsible, easy for the government to prevent. 
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, 
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that preju-
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dice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual con-
flict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches 
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's du-
ties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect 
on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting in-
terests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of 
interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in 
certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g., 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal 
justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed 
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not 
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the · th 
Amen ment claims mentiOned above. rejudice is pre-
sume on y if tne de endantdemonstrates that counsel "ac-
tively represented conflicting interests" and "that an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his ·lawyer's perform-
ance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote 
omitted). 
Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness 
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are sub-
ject to a gene al re uirement that the defendant affirma-
tiv~ly ~Eve pr~ce. The government is not responsible 
for, an ence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will 
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney er-
rors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly 
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. 
They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing 
prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision 
to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to 
avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that 
is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of 1. 
counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must 
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. 
It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors 
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed-
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ing. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet 
that test, cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 
858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably 
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability 
of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests re-
quiring a showing that the errors "impaired the presentation 
of the defense." Brief of Respondent 58. That standard, 
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if 
it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the de-
fense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it pro-
vides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently 
serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not 
show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than notal-
tered the outcome in the case. T h1s outcome::.determinative 
stan ard has severa strengths. It defines the relevant in-
quiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is in-
evitable, is anything but precise. The standard also reflects 
the profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings. 
Moreover, it com orts with the widely used standard for as-
sessi:r_!g motio.!l§jQr new trial base on newly discovered evi-
dence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20 ----.., 
& nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite 
appropriate. 
Even when the specified attorney error results in the omis-
sion of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence 
standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice 
standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for 
newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the es-
sential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair pro-
ceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is chal-
lenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112 
(1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence 
of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceed-
ing 1 s re~ ffiiality concerns are somewhat weaker and 
7 
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the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat 
lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreli- \ ? 
able, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors 
of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance oft e evi-
dence to ave e ermme e outcome. 
Accordmgry,-the appropriate test for prejudice finds its 
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information 
not disclosed to the defense y the prosecu wn, nited States 
v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test forma-
teriality of testimony made unavailabre to the defense by 
government deportation of a witness, United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S., at 872-874. The defendant / LJ ~ f-
must show that there is a/reasonable probability _E.t, but for ~
counse 's unprofessional errors, t ~proc~ding I\ . ~ ... 1. d. 
would have been iffe nt. A reasonable probability is a 
proba ility sufficient to undermine confidence in the /~~ ,. 
outcome. . -o./ 1/J.-~ 
In making the determination whether the specified errors ~ f /~,_ tf - " 
resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, 
absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary 
insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. 
An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to 
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, 
whimsy, caprice, "nullification," ·and the like. A defendant 
has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, 
even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assess-
ment of prejudice must assume that the decision was made 
according to the governing legal standard. Thus, when a de-
fendant challenges the conviction, the question is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 
guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as 
the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer 
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. 
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In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffec-
tiveness claim must consider the totality o~e be-
fore ~gej?J jury. Some of the factual ffudings will have 
been unaffeCfed by the errors, and factual findings that were 
affected will have been affected in different ways. Some er-
rors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary pic-
ture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. 
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by 
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than 
one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaf-
fected findings as a given, and taking due account of the ef-
fect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making 
the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the 
burden of showing that the decision reached would reason-
ably likely have been different absent the errors. 
IV 
A number of practical considerations are important for the 
application of the standards we have outlined. Most impor-
tant, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of coun-
sel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have 
stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those 
principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate 
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding w.!J.ose result is being cliallengeO. In every case 
the court should be concerned with whether, despite the 
strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular 
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adver-
sarial process that our system counts on to produce just 
results. 
To the extent that this has already been the guiding in-
quiry in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do 
not require reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected 
under different standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States, 
725 F. 2d, at -- - -- (in several years of applying "farce 
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and mockery" standard along with "reasonable competence" 
standard, court "never found that the result of a case hinged 
on the choice of a particular standard"). In particular, the 
minor differences in the lower courts' precise formulations of 
the performance standard are insignificant: the different for-
mulations are mere variations of the overarching reasonable-
ness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only 
the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards 
articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on 
defendants than the tests laid down today. The difference, 
however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim 
only in the rarest case. 
Although we have discussed the performance component of 
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, 
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assist-
ance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even 
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 
makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court 
need not determine whether counsel's performance was defi-
cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defend-
ant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an 
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. 
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will 
often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should 
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so 
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal jus-
tice system suffers as a result. 
The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should 
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct 
appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated by the 
"cause and prejudice" test for overcoming procedural waivers 
of claims of error, the presumption that a criminal judgment 
is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judg-
ment. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 162-169 
(1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126--129 (1982). An in-
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effectiveness claim, however, as our articulation of the stand-
ards that govern decision of such claims makes clear, is an at-
tack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose 
result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness is the cen-
tral concern of the writ of habeas corpus, see id., at 126, no 
special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims 
made in habeas proceedings. 
Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal 
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered ef-
fective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the fed-
eral court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In-
effectiveness is not a question of"basic, primary, or historical 
fact[]," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963). 
Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in 
a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a 
mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in 
the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to 
. the deference requirement of§ 2254(d), and although District 
Court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(a), both the performance and 
prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are 
mixed questions of law and fact. 
v 
Having articulated general standards for judging ineffec-
tiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to 
the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the 
general principles. The record makes it possible to do so. 
There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts 
over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated 
are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the 
Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that 
the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles. 
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292 
(1982). 
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Application of the principles is not difficult in this case. 
The facts as described above, see supra, at -- - --, 
make clear that the conduct of respondent's counsel at and 
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found 
unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the 
challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent 
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his 
death sentence. 
With respect to the performance component, the record 
shows that respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to 
argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circum-
stance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent's accept-
ance of responsibility for his crimes. This decision was well 
within the range of professionally reasonable judgments, and 
\the decision not to seek more character or psychological evi-
dence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable. 
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to 
one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating 
circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel 
could reasonably surmise from his conversations with re-
spondent that character and psychological evidence would be 
of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention 
at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know 
about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testi-
mony on respondent's character to what had come in at the 
plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychologi-
cal evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel 
had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On 
these facts, there can be little question, even without applica-
tion of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial 
counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of rea-
sonable professional judgment. 
With respect to the prejudice component, the inadequacy 
of respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that 
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the 
sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing 
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profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state 
courts and District Court found, at most this evidence shows 
that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was 
generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psy-
chologist believed he was under considerable emotional 
stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance. 
Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no rea-
sonable probability that the omitted evidence would have 
changed the sentencing decision of the judge who, on the 
record he had before him, concluded that the aggravating cir-
cumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and 
sentenced respondent to death. Indeed, admission of the ev-
idence respondent now offers might even have been harmful 
to his case: his "rap sheet" would probably have been admit-
ted into evidence, and the psychological reports would have 
directly contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating 
circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to his 
case. 
Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance 
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on 
the trial judge's testimony at the District Court hearing. 
We therefore need not consider the admissibility of that testi-
mony. Moreover, the prejudice question is resolvable, and 
hence the ineffectiveness claim can be rejected, without re-
gard to the evidence presented at the District Court hearing. 
The state courts properly concluded that the ineffectiveness 
claim was meritless without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Failure to make the required showing of either deficient 
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffective-
ness claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally, 
respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sen-
tence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adver-
sary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance. 
Respondent's sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally 
unfair. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly 
declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is accordingly 
Reversed. 
CHAMEIERS OF 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
.Supxtmt <!fltllrl of flrt ~h ;§taU~ 
~~ ~. <!J. 2!lp'!~ 
March 13, 1984 
Re: Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554 
Dear Sandra: 
I agree with most of the legal analysis in your 
careful and scholarly opinion, but I still agree with the 
view that prevailed at Conference that we should vacate 
and remand rather than reverse outright. I am the ref ore 
troubled by Part V of your opinion. 
Applying the "performance" component, you write that 
"the record shows that respondent's counsel made a 
strategic choice" not to investigate potentially 
mitigating circumstances. Op. at 28. I certainly agree 
that this might have been the case, but I am not sure we 
are free to make such a factual finding for ourselves. 
The District Court found: "It is evident that in the 
instant case, Mr. Tunkey' s judgment was affected by the 
evidence of Washington's guilt and his desire to plead 
gui 1 ty. Mr. Tun key candidly admitted that once the 
multiple confessions were given, he had a feeling that 
nothing could be done to save Washington and that this 
feeling was behind his failure to do an independent 
investigation into petitioner's background and 
potentially mitigating emotional and mental reasons for 
the killings." App. to Pet. for Cert. A282. 
As I read this passage, it suggests at least a 
strong possibility that Tun key's . decision was not the 
product of a strategy, but rather of a sense of 
hopelessness. I do oot consider it "reasonable" for 
counsel in a death case to make decisions based on a 
feeling of hopelessness and frustration. Indeed, it 
seems to me that the worse the client's plight, the more 
important it is that his lawyer acts professionally and 
not on the basis of emotion. It is true that there are 
other passages in the District Court's opinion indicating 
that T unkey did act on the bas is of strategy. That 
opinion is, however, ambiguous and the courts below did 
not, of course, have before them the standards we are 
announcing in this case. I think it is hazardous for us 
to try to apply the new standards to a cold record and 
determine for ourselves the real basis for Tun key's 
decisions. Instead, · I believe we should remand for 
application of the new standards to the facts of this 
case. 
As to the "prejudice" component of the ineffective 
assistance standards, the District Court's findings 
cannot be used to justify a reversal because, as the 
Court of Appeals explained, the District Court did not 
employ the Agurs standard in analyzing prejudice and it 
improperly relied on Judge Fuller's testimony. 
Accordingly, your opinion engages in its own assessment 
of the facts, and concludes that none of the evidence 
Tunkey could have adduced rose to the level of "extreme 
emotional disturbance." Whether any such evidence could 
have satisfied the statutory mitigating factor is, 
however, a question of Florida law we are not competent 
to resolve. 
Moreover, even if that factor would not have been 
satisfied, the Constitution requires that all non-
statutory mitigating factors must be considered as well. 
The extreme pressure on Washington that he claims 
resulted from his inability to support his family, 
although perhaps not amounting to "extreme emotional 
distress" under Florida law, could well meet the test of 
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting 
Lockett v. Oh1o, 438 u.s. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality 
op1nion)). The sentencing judge had oo explanation for 
Washington's extraordinary conduct before him, nor was 
there any testimony fran persons who knew the defendant 
before his crime spree and who could explain what kind of 
person he was. All the sentencing judge had, as a result 
of Tun key's decision not to investigate further, was 
Washington's "apology." The fact that the sentencing 
judge had virtually no information concerning Washington 
the man creates, in my judgment, a reasonable doubt about 
the outcome that would not otherwise exist--or, to 
paraphrase your opinion, undermines my confidence in the 
outcome. 
Although it seems unlikely that the evidence will 
ultimately suffice to satisfy the standards laid out in 
your opinion, I am not so convinced of that fact that I 
think we should make the necessary findings of fact 
ourselves on a cold record, especially in the context of 
a death case. I am also convinced that a remand for 
application of the new standard to the facts by the 
appropriate factfinder would better indicate to the lower 
courts that in addressing these claims they should employ 
the care and thoroughness that your opinion demands. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
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March 13, 1984 
No. 82-1554 Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Bill, 
Thank you for your quick response in this case. Part V of 
the draft was included because it seems to me to be not only 
possible but helpful to apply the standards announced in the 
opinion to the facts of the case. 
It is helpful because it gives a concrete illustration of how 
the otherwise abstract principles articulated in the opinion 
apply to one particular set of facts. That is both useful to 
lower courts and common, though not mandatory, practice for this 
Court. It is possible to apply the principles in this case, as 
the opinion notes at page 27, because the standards announced in 
the opinion are close enough to those applied by the state courts 
and District Court that no errors of law can be said to have 
infected their factfinding-and because their factfinding provides 
a complete record on which to assess adequacy of performance and 
prejudice. The performance and prejudice inquiries are mixed 
questions of law and fact, moreover, so we may answer them even 
though the lower factfinding courts have not applied precisely 
the standards articulated in the circulating opinion. 
In particular, with respect to the performance inquiry, the 
opinion acknowledges that trial counsel's sense of hopelessness 
affected his judgment, but that hardly renders his performance 
unprofessional. If it did, any counsel who felt hopeless about a 
case would have to be disqualified. Surely overconfidence is no 
prerequisite to adequate performance. The question is not how 
counsel feels but what counsel does, and the record here makes 
clear that respondent's counsel made professional decisions. 
With respect to the prejudice inquiry, application of the 
standards is likewise warranted. You suggest that it is a 
question of Florida law whether the statutory mitigating 
circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance could be found 
present on the proffered evidence; if that is so, the matter is 
foreclosed by the Florida courts' negative answer to that 
question in this case. In any event, respondent argues only that 
counsel failed to investigate nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances. Concerning such circumstances, the circulating 
opinion acknowledges that, as you say, the affidavit evidence 
might well have counted in favor of respondent by portraying him 
as a basically good person. But given the overwhelming 
aggravating circumstances, I believe there is no reasonable 
probability--unless any favorable evidence at all is enough to 
upset confidence in the result--that submission of this fairly 
weak affidavit evidence would have made any difference in the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by Judge 
Fuller. This conclusion, as the opinion points out, does not 
depend at all on Judge Fuller's testimony. 
Naturally, if there are not five of us who are willing to 
apply the principles enunciated to the facts, I will revise the 
draft to provide for a remand. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
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March 14, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1554 Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. I think that without Section V, in which 
you apply the standards developed in the earlier part of the 
opinion to the facts of this case, the opinion is somewhat abstract 
and might mean a number of things to a nUmBer of people. I think 
the lower courts will get a far better idea of what the opinion 
means if we ourselves apply it to the facts of this case. 
Therefore, I hope you decide to retain Section V. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE: CHIEF .JUSTICE: 
.iJtFtm.t <!fomi Df tJtt ~b .jtatt.e 
"a.eJringhtn. Jl. Of. 2Dpll~ 
March 14, 1984 
82-1554 - Strickland, Supt. v. Washington 
Dear Sandra: 
/ 
I join. I see no need to remand. I may have a 
thought or two later on, but you may show me as joining. 
Regards, 
Justice O'Connor 
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.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE March 22, 1984 
Re: 82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Sandra, 
Join me, please. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 
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..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 22, 1984 
Re: 82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Sandra: 
As I have told you, I think you have written an 
excellent opinion. The only reason I have not joined 
you is that I am still inclined to believe that we 
should adhere to the position taken by the majority at 
conference and remand for application of the standard 
set forth in your opinion. Whichever disposition the 
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Re: No. 82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
March 26, 1984 
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Sincerely, ... ,,,..,,. , ' ·' 
~~ 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
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Re: 82-1554 - Strickland v. Washington 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
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